SAINTPLUME

To Hold the State: Obedience, Power, and Institutional Stability

By N.B. — Estimated reading time: 6 minutes

State stability has never relied exclusively on force. From Machiavelli’s early reflections on mantenere lo stato1 to contemporary analyses of governance, the durability of political orders depends on the integration of limited coercion, predictable administrative routines, and widely internalized expectations of legitimacy. Modern scholarship demonstrates that obedience is rarely produced through sustained violence; rather, it emerges from institutional arrangements that make compliance rational, low-cost, and socially reinforced.2 The transformation of disciplinary mechanisms into bureaucratic procedures further shifted the locus of power from overt intervention to the management of incentives, information, and classification.3 The following analysis examines this evolution, drawing on historical cases and contemporary research to understand how states secure continuity without reliance on constant coercive pressure.

The endurance of political authority has long depended on a state’s ability to secure compliance while minimizing the economic, social, and reputational costs associated with coercion. Early political theorists identified this tension clearly. Machiavelli’s treatment of mantenere lo stato proposed that rulers should apply coercive measures only in ways that resolve acute instability and establish a predictable order, rather than create cycles of retaliation or fear-driven volatility.1 This interpretation of limited and strategically calibrated force anticipated the findings of later governance research, which consistently demonstrates that excessive violence undermines institutional legitimacy and raises the cost of rule.4

As states expanded their administrative capacities, the production of obedience shifted from episodic coercion to continuous, low-visibility forms of discipline embedded in routine governance. Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary societies captures this transformation: power is exercised less through spectacular interventions and more through the organization of information, the standardization of procedures, and the management of classification systems that shape individual behaviour long before enforcement becomes necessary.2 Compliance becomes an administrative outcome rather than a direct product of coercive force. Contemporary policy literature describes these dynamics as compliance infrastructures, emphasizing how procedural predictability and institutional routinization reduce the perceived costs of obeying regulations.5

Historically, political orders that achieved long-term stability relied on a combined foundation of strategic coercion, growing bureaucratic sophistication, and forms of legitimacy that made the state’s authority appear reasonable and expected. Weber’s analysis of legal-rational authority demonstrates that citizens are more likely to comply with state directives when they perceive institutions as predictable, rule-bound, and procedurally just.6 This expectation reduces the need for overt sanctions and replaces them with behavioural norms internalized through socialization, education, and administrative interaction. La Boétie’s earlier reflections on voluntary servitude likewise suggest that obedience often arises from a learned acceptance of established hierarchies, especially when alternative political arrangements seem risky or impractical.7

Throughout global history, administrative institutions have played a central role in shaping the forms and limits of state power. Renaissance Italian polities, the Ottoman administrative system, British colonial bureaucracies, and imperial Chinese governance each developed mechanisms through which compliance became part of the ordinary functioning of society. These systems differed widely in culture and structure, yet all demonstrated that authority is reinforced when institutions define the boundaries of lawful behaviour in ways that appear consistent and inevitable. In such contexts, violence becomes a latent resource rather than an active tool. Its possibility underpins the order, but its use becomes increasingly rare as administrative routines stabilize citizen expectations.8

Modern political theory extends this analysis into the conceptual domain of procedural and symbolic forms of power. Agamben’s notion of sovereign decision-making and Mbembe’s exploration of necropolitics illustrate how authority is exercised through the management of inclusion and exclusion, rights and suspensions, rather than through constant physical intervention.9 Contemporary policy-oriented research on state capacity further supports this view, showing that governments with strong administrative systems and relatively high legitimacy maintain stability even in contexts of limited coercive resources.10 Conversely, states that rely heavily on coercion tend to experience declining trust, increasing resistance, and higher governance costs.11

The durability of states, therefore, is best explained through an integrated framework that links coercive capability, bureaucratic organization, and legitimacy. Coercion remains essential for addressing existential threats, but its strategic use ensures that violence does not become the primary mode of governance. Administrative systems structure behaviour through predictable processes, allowing individuals and communities to anticipate state actions and align their choices accordingly. Legitimacy provides the normative foundation through which compliance is understood not as submission but as participation in a stable political order.12 The interaction of these factors produces environments in which obedience is a rational and often unexamined response, reducing the need for recurrent enforcement.

Taken together, the historical and theoretical evidence demonstrates that states preserve continuity not by exerting constant force but by shaping the conditions under which force becomes unnecessary. Stability emerges when institutional routines, social expectations, and administrative norms converge to make compliance the most predictable and least costly option. The state’s capacity to endure rests not on its ability to compel, but on its success in establishing a political environment where obedience is structurally incentivized, procedurally reinforced, and widely perceived as the default behaviour. This framework provides a foundation for understanding both past governance systems and contemporary institutional dynamics without reference to any specific modern state or political context.

Sources & Footnotes

  1. Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, ch. VII–VIII (1532).
  2. Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris: Gallimard, 1975).
  3. David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford University Press, 2001).
  4. Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Harcourt, 1970).
  5. Margaret Levi, “Compliance and Administrative Design,” Governance, 2006.
  6. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 1919.
  7. Étienne de La Boétie, Discours de la servitude volontaire (1576).
  8. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992 (Blackwell, 1992).
  9. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University Press, 1998); Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,” Public Culture, 15(1), 2003.
  10. OECD, States of Fragility Report, 2020.
  11. James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (Yale University Press, 1998).
  12. Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press, 2006).